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Explaining differences in efficiency: an application to 
Spanish municipalities
This paper investigates efficiency in the municipal sector of the Region of Murcia 
(Spain). With that aim, data of 31 municipalities (69% of the response rate) have been 
collected. Services analyzed are: police, culture, sports, green areas, refuse collection 
and water supply. Ratios of efficiency have been related to other control variables, 
such as economic level, size of the municipality, decentralization, political sign and 
financial situation. A weak positive relation between economic level and efficiency 
arises. Some weak evidence also exists that public management of refuse collection is 
more efficient than private. In water supply, public management by means of a 
company controlled by the local government is clearly more efficient than private. It 
also seems that the higher the tax burden, the greater the efficiency in providing 
services.
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1
Explaining differences in efficiency: an application to Spanish
municipalities
1. Introduction
At the present time there is a clear concern in the developed countries about the 
improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in public sector activities. This is a 
consequence, on the one hand, of the demand of more and better public services and on 
the other hand, of the limitations on public incomes and indebtedness. In this respect, 
the Monetary Union in the European Community has established that all the 
participating member states must achieve the budgetary stability. These provoked that 
the Spanish government enacted the General Law of Budgetary Stability, 18/2001, 12 
December 2001. These Law obliges the public sector and different agencies (Central 
Government, Autonomous Communities, Local Authorities, Social Security, and 
owned public companies) to close their books in balance. Deficit is only contemplated 
in exceptional circumstances and this law gives legal expression to the balanced budget 
principle to carry out the budget balance and economic growth.
Public management analysis has been receiving more and more attention. On the one 
hand, the available amount of government resources is limited: rising taxes is 
politically costly, and there are legal limitations to increasing indebtedness. On the 
other hand, there is a growing demand for public services. Therefore, the public sector 
is bound to boost its efficiency in order to provide more services (output) restricted to a 
limited amount of resources (input).
Once the need to evaluate the public sector is stated, methodologies for this analysis 
have been developed. Among them, we can emphasize the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), as the mathematical technique internationally accepted by the literature. This 
methodology has been successfully applied to public services provided by 
municipalities of several Spanish regions (Diez-Ticio et al., 2000; Bosch et al., 2000; 
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2
Giménez and Prior, 2003; Prieto and Zofio, 2001; Balaguer et al., 2007; Giménez and 
Prior, 2007). 
The implementation of techniques of management efficiency analysis is essential. In 
this way, the Spanish Public Administration (Intervención General de la 
Administración del Estado, IGAE, 1997) has made great efforts in the measurement of 
objectives achievement (with the development of specialized software). Similar efforts 
have been developed in other highly developed countries (Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) 1. 
In an international scope, it is worth to mention the case of the United States. In this 
country, Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) has issued documents 
providing the methodology for the municipalities to calculate and disclose efficiency 
indicators (Fountain and Roob, 1994; GASB, 1990, 1994). In addition, GASB has 
promoted the establishment of standardized municipal efficiency indicators that allow 
both the comparison between different municipalities and the analysis of the evolution 
of the efficiency in one municipality. Likewise, in Spain, the Association of 
Accounting and Business Management (Asociación Española de Contabilidad y 
Administración de Empresas, AECA) issued a document entitled "Management 
Indicators for Public Organizations", becoming a guide for Public Organizations to 
implement management indicators in order to evaluate effectiveness, economy and 
efficiency. In this document, DEA methodology is acknowledged as an appropriate 
technique to make this evaluation (pp. 78-80). This document has been complemented 
by another one entitled "A System of Management Indicators for Municipalities", 
which describes a list of indicators to be used to evaluate municipal management. 
Furthermore, it shows a set of rules, characteristics and methodological guidelines to 
ensure the quality of these indicators. 
1
 For an insight on these countries’ projects, see Joumard et al. (2004) and this OECD web 
page: http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (on 9 June  
2007)
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Focusing on the Spanish local sector, Andalusian and Catalan municipalities (Navarro, 
1998; Ortiz, 2003; Giménez and Prior, 2000) have already developed efficiency 
analysis projects. 
In the Spanish health system (Pina and Torres, 1992 and García et al., 1999) DEA 
methodology is being successfully applied in the last years. In this way, the Region of 
Murcia2 has already developed several projects that have allowed it to improve 
efficiency levels. These projects have become essential to provide useful information 
to the political decision making. 
The problem of the measurement of inputs/outputs, that in the private sector is 
relatively simple, gets complicated in the public sector, because of the difficulty to 
establish these parameters. As a result of this, a number of works have been devoted to 
establish and validate efficiency indicators in the public sector in general. For example, 
Navarro (1998), Ortiz (2003) and AECA (2004) develop a battery of useful indicators 
for several municipal services, such as: police, culture, sports, green areas, housing, 
fire-fighting services, refuse collection, water supply and cleaning, street lighting, 
general services and financial, economic and budgetary management. Some of these 
services are investigated in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the 
research objective and methodology. Section 3 reviews previous literature on 
evaluation of municipal management. Section 4 describes the sample of municipalities 
and the inputs/outpus used in the empirical research. Besides, it presents the variables 
that are going to be related with efficiency indicators. Section 5 examines relationships 
among variables. Finally, section 6 summarizes conclusions, presents limitations and 
proposes further research.
2 In terms of surface area the Region of Murcia is the ninth largest of the Spanish autonomous 
communities and lies at the centre of the Spanish Mediterranean coastal arch. According 
to the most recent census figures (1 January 2005) the Region of Murcia has a population of  
1,335,792 inhabitants.
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2. Objective and methodology
So far, few works have focused on the evaluation of municipal efficiency. However, a 
great number of works have analyzed other sectors such as education or health. We 
think the main reasons lie, on the one hand, in the problems faced when trying to 
collect municipal data, and on the other hand, on the troubles arising in the 
measurement of public outputs. From the perspective of the municipal management we 
can emphasize the contributions made by Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et 
al. (1994) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996), who analyze the Belgian experience of 
municipal efficiency evaluation; Worthington (2000), who evaluates by means of 
econometric techniques and linear programming the efficiency of local governments 
(LG) in Australia; Taïrou (2000), who evaluates the efficiency of the French 
municipalities from the point of view of its financial condition; Waldo (2001), who 
investigates local administration efficiency in Sweden; Hollingsworth et al. (2002), 
who assess the cost and production efficiency of local government programs for 
childhood immunization in urban and rural settings in Australia; Sampaio and Stosic 
(2005), that estimate the DEA technical efficiency for 4796 Brazilian municipalities; 
and Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005), who study the cost efficiency of basic welfare 
service provision in 353 Finnish municipalities in 1994-2002.
In Spain, we can highlight the works of Vilardell (1998); Diez-Ticio et al. (2000); 
Bosch et al. (2000); Giménez and Prior (2003); Prieto and Zofio (2001); Balaguer 
(2004), Balaguer et al. (2007) and García-Valiñas and Muñiz (2007).
Our work is aimed to contribute to the Local Government (LG) literature, with regard 
to the efficiency assessment. Thus, we analyze the efficiency of 6 local services of 
Spanish LG of the Region of Murcia by means of DEA methodology: police, refuse 
collection, culture, sports, green areas and water supply. We sent a questionnaire3 to all 
of them asking for information about year 2002. The reason for choosing this year is 
that in the middle of 2004 some LG may have not closed 2003 budget. In a second 
3
 The questionnaire was sent to all LG financial managers of the Region of Murcia on 15 June 
2004. The reception of questionnaires finished on 31 May 2005.
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phase, we checked all the information with the department heads of all services 
included in the study for each LG. The objective was to correct the missing 
information and information errors. The sample obtained covers a high proportion of 
the population of LG of the Region of Murcia (69%). The LG structure of this Spanish 
Region enhances our analysis. On the one hand, it is composed of a small number (45) 
of relatively large LG. On the other hand, we find an appropriate variability of LG 
characteristics, since for example it has one of the largest LG of Spain in terms of km2
(Lorca), together with a LG with high population density (Alcantarilla). In this way, 
our sample presents a suitable variability in our control variables.
The efficiency indicators have been related to other municipal variables, such as 
economic level (per capita income), LG size, decentralization level, political sign and 
fiscal effort. Thus, we investigate which variables, according to the literature, influence 
LG efficiency. Municipal variables have been selected based essentially upon the 
works of Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993); De Borger et al. (1994); De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996); Worthington (2000); Bosch et al. (2000); and Giménez and Prior 
(2003).
From our point of view, our results are relevant not only for politicians, public 
managers and researchers, but also for the citizens. The latter, as taxpayers and 
recipients of municipal services, on the one hand, demand information about LG 
activities and on the other, request improvement of LG performance.
DEA is a technique based on linear programming, used to measure the relative activity 
of organizational units when there are multiple resources (inputs) and multiple results 
(outputs). A great variety of applications of DEA have been developed to evaluate the 
activity of diverse types of organizations from different sectors in several countries. 
One of the reasons of the broad use of DEA could be the problems faced by other 
approaches because of the complex (often unknown) nature of the relationships 
between resources and results of these activities.
DEA analysis has also been applied to provide new approaches about activities (and 
organizations) that had previously been evaluated using other methods.
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The evaluation of the organizations’ activity can be tackled through a variety of 
indicators. Some of them are established as a quotient:
input
output
Usually this ratio is used in order to assess the organizations’ efficiency. 
Productivity measures also assume ratio form when they are used to evaluate the 
activity of workers: sales per worker, units made by worker and hour, etc. These 
measures we can be referred to more exactly as partial productivity measures, in order 
to distinguish them from measures of total productivity of the factors. The latter try to 
obtain a similar ratio, but they take into account simultaneously all the resources 
(inputs) and all the results (outputs).
One of the advantages of DEA is that it does not require a previous specification of the 
weights of each input/output. Furthermore it does not require assumptions about the 
form of the production function, which are so common in statistical regressions and in 
many other circumstancies. That is why relationships between variables are evaluated 
by means of bivariate statistical tests. Eventually, since it uses mathematical 
programming techniques, it is able to handle a high number of variables and 
relationships (restrictions).
Thus, DEA is usually used in the evaluation of the efficiency of a certain number of 
producers, comparing each one of them only with the best producers. 
Unlike usual statistical approaches evaluating units in reference to their average, DEA 
is a method of extreme point, defining a border where efficient units are located. 
Inefficiency is established in relation to this efficiency border. 
A common measurement of relative efficiency is:
Weighted sum of outputs
Efficiency=
Weighted sum of inputs
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As an initial assumption, this measurement needs a common set of weights to be 
applied to all the analysed units. Two problems arise when it comes to reach an 
agreement to obtain this set of weights: on the one hand, the difficulty to measure 
inputs and outputs and, on the other hand, the allocation of weights itself, which is a 
controversial process because of its subjectivity. Accordingly, this measurement of the 
efficiency with a common set of weights does not seem correct.
According to Charnes et al. (1978), our analysis allows each unit to establish its own 
set of weights, in order to reach the most favourable combination in comparison with 
the rest of the units. Thus, the efficiency of the unit (j0) can be obtained by solving the 
following problem:
To maximize the efficiency of unit j0, conditional to that the efficiency of all the units is 1.
The unknown quantities of this problem are the weights, and the solution shows on the 
one hand, the most favourable weights to the unit, and on the other, the efficiency 
measurement of each unit.
The mathematical model is as it follows:

=
=




ir
i
iji
r
rjr
i
iji
r
rjr
vu
xv
yu
ts
xv
yu
Max
,
)(1,2,....Nj1..
h
0
0
0
Where yrj and xij represent outputs and inputs of unit j respectively. The variables of 
the problem are ur and vi (weights). These latter are supposed to be greater or equal 
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than a certain small positive amount, in order to prevent some input or output from 
being totally ignored in the efficiency assessment.
The solution to this problem yields a value of h0 between 0 and 1, which is a 
measurement of the relative efficiency of unit j0. If h0= 1, then unit j0 is efficient in 
relation to the other units, and if h0<1, other units are more efficient than j0.
This flexibility in the election of the weights means at the same time a weakness and 
strength of DEA. It is a weakness because a correct election of weights of a unit (it is 
likely that this choice is not related to values of inputs and outputs) may allow this unit 
to appear as efficient. However, this efficiency may have to do more with the election 
of weights than with its inherent efficiency. Simultaneously, it is a strength since if one 
unit is inefficient, it is so with the most favourable set of weights. Thus, the argument 
that the inefficiency is due to incorrect weights is not acceptable.
In our DEA analysis, variable returns to scale (Models BCC) and output oriented 
models (output orientation) have been considered, that is to say, aimed at maximize the 
results with a given level of resources4. 
3. Revision of Literature
3.1. Economic level and tourist character
Some authors show that the greater the economic level of the LG and therefore the
greater the income it collects, the less pressure exists on LG politicians and managers 
in order to reach efficiency in the provision of municipal services (Spann, 1977; 
Silkman and Young, 1982). In a similar way, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) find that 
greater economic level is linked to more inefficiency. However, Giménez and Prior 
(2003) analyse the impact of municipal economic level on efficiency. They conclude 
that differences in economic level are not significant when evaluating efficiency.
4 The application used to solve the mathematical problem has been DEA-Solver-LV developed 
by Cooper et al. (2000) on Microsoft Excel.
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With regard to the tourist character of the LG, some authors (Mathieson and Passell, 
1976; Díez-Ticio and Mancebón, 2003) explain that seasonal populations have an 
impact on municipal services, specifically on police (which is one of the services this 
paper evaluates). The argument is based on two points. On the one hand, the more 
stable the population is, the narrower the relationship with police is expected, leading 
to a greater collaboration to solve problems arising in the neighbourhood. On the other 
hand, population variability means a lower identification of the people with their place 
and, consequently, a smaller concern about collective problems.
If we take a look at other works investigating the tourist condition of municipalities, 
we see there is not agreement in the literature. Bosch et al. (2000) find that tourist level 
of the LG has an impact on efficiency. On the contrary, Bel (2006) concludes that 
tourist activity is not significant when it comes to assessing the efficiency of 
municipalities of Cataluña (Spain).
3.2. Size of the Local Government
With respect to police, Díez-Ticio and Mancebón (2003) state a negative link between 
LG size and police efficiency. They argue that an increase in the territory reduces 
intensity of the patrol services. On the other hand, the greater the population is, the 
greater the dedication to more responsibilities is, and accordingly the less efficiency in 
the provision of the service appears (Carr- Hill and Stern, 1979; Darrough and 
Heineke, 1979; Gyimah-Brempong, 1987 and 1989; and Cameron, 1989).
Regarding the service of refuse collection, Stevens (1978), Dubin and Navarro (1988) 
and Callan and Thomas (2001) also find greater efficiency in municipalities with 
smaller population. Nevertheless, for the same service, Kitchen (1976) finds economies 
of scale while LG size increases up to 324.000 inhabitants5.
Considering the global efficiency of the LG, Giménez and Prior (2003), find that 
greater population is linked to higher inefficiency in a sample of Spanish LG. De 
5
 Which is very similar to the size of greater LG of the sample, Murcia.
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Borger and Kerstens (1996) also find that lower population density leads to greater 
inefficiency.
3.3. Public vs. private management
Although being an old discussion, private vs. public and in-house vs. out-house 
management comparisons have become quite fashionable in the last decades due to 
New Public Management reforms. Although a “magic recipe” for achieving efficiency 
in public services is far to be unambiguously stated, we think it is interesting to add 
more evidence on this issue to the literature.
So far, the majority of the DEA studies have focused on investigating whether the 
public service is more efficiently provided by the LG or by private companies. There is 
not agreement in the literature (Lovell and Muñiz, 2003, and Bosch et al., 2000, make 
a very complete revision of these works).
Tang (1997), in a revision of previous literature, finds that private management is more 
efficient in refuse collection, cleaning, residual water treatment and fire-fighting 
services. Nevertheless, in water supply and railroads results are not conclusive.
3.4. Political sign
The political-economic literature supports the thesis that “partisan politics matters”, 
i.e., that ideology matters in public sector management and performance (Cusack, 
1997). However, empirical findings are not totally conclusive, specially at the 
municipal level. For instance, Abizadeh and Gray (1993), Benito and Bastida (2004) 
and Hagen and Vabo (2005) fail to prove a poorer performance of progressive
municipal parties. All these works are connected with the so-called “convergence” 
school of thought, which argues that societies of the twentieth century have become 
increasingly similar, facing the same kind of problems and thus using the same kind of 
solutions. Consequently, political differences do not matter much when it comes to 
explain variations in policy outputs (Skinner, 1976; Thomas, 1980). Likewise, other 
authors argue that over the last two decades partisanship differences have narrowed. 
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Because of financial and economic integration, partisan preferences have become less 
important in implementing public policies. This could explain that there is only mixed 
empirical evidence of the “partisan politics matters” thesis.
Few works focus on the impact of political factors on LG efficiency. De Borger and
Kerstens (1996) conclude that socialist party participation in government coalitions of 
Belgian LG means higher degree of efficiency than liberal party participation. De 
Grauwe (1985) drew a similar conclusion. On the contrary, Vanden Eeckaut et al.
(1993) do not find significant influence of the political sign of the incumbents. We 
think it is interesting to know if incumbents’ political sign influences efficiency, as the 
“partisan politics matte s” thesis assumes.
3.5. Financial constraints: fiscal burden, indebtedness, working capital
We define the fiscal burden as the proportion coming from taxes out of the total 
municipal income. At the outset, we assume that the greater fiscal burden is, the greater 
the demand by taxpayers for efficient provision of services will be (Spann, 1977; Davis 
and Hayes, 1993; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).
However, it is not possible to predict the influence of indebtedness on the efficiency. 
In a first approach, following Worthington (2000), we could argue that it will affect 
negatively. The greater the level of municipal indebtedness, the more resources will be 
devoted to attend debt payments. Thus, less resources will finance the provision of LG 
services (cultural, sports, etc.).
Dijkgraaf et al. (2003) argue that LG with financial problems are concerned about 
services efficiency improvement, which leads to obtain costs savings. We have 
considered the working capital as an indicator of the LG short term financial situation.
4. Sample and variables
The sample is composed by 31 municipalities of the Region of Murcia (69% of 
response rate and a population of 91% of the total population of the Region of 
Murcia). Our selection of outputs is based on the works of Navarro (1998), Ortiz 
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(2003) and AECA (2004), who developed a group of indicators to assess several areas 
of municipal management. Regarding inputs, we have used actual budget figures  
instead of budget estimates (Giménez and Prior, 2003; Prieto and Zofio, 2001; Taïrou, 
2000; Vanden Eeckant et al., 1993). This makes us face a time lag due to the months 
LG need to elaborate final budget reports. However, we think actual figures essential, 
since it is generally known that budget estimates overestimate incomes and 
underestimate expenditures. Eventually, when a public service is provided by a 
company, we use as inputs the corresponding information from their income statement 
(issued in accordance with the Spanish Chart of Accounts).
Out of the total initial input/output variables, table 1 shows inputs and outputs finally 
used to measure efficiency of each service. The selection has been made, on the one 
hand, for the sake of relevance, and on the other, considering its availability in the 
municipalities surveyed (i.e., minimum number of missing values). This is the reason 
why not all LG have been included in all the partial analyses, due to the lack of 
available data about variables for the analysis.
(Insert Table 1)
Focusing on each service, maximum efficiency is achieved by the following LG, 
ordered from minimum to maximum proportion of efficient LG: green areas 3/23 
(13%), water supply 4/21 (19%), refuse collection 4/19 (21%), police 10/27 (37%), 
culture 9/23 (39%), sports 16/23 (70%). Green areas is the service where we find the 
lowest number of efficient LG. However, sports is a more homogeneous service, where 
7 out of 10 LG achieves maximum level of efficiency (1).
As stated above, in order to investigate which characteristics of LG are related to 
efficiency, we have created several variables. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of 
these variables.
(Insert Table 2)
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Variables econlevel and tourindex were drawn from La Caixa (2004). Variables 
iecon_00, isbie_00 and rfdpc_00 correspond to 2000 (latest available data). Variables 
population and sqkmext are available in the Spanish National Institute of Statistic web 
page. Polsign comes from Ministry of the Interior web page. The web page of the 
General Department of Territorial Finances provides data of municipal budgets, needed 
to calculate taxburdrev. The Local Administration Department of the Region of Murcia 
provides data to create variables lrdebtpc and wcapitalpc (available as of 31.12.2001).
Next section investigates relationships between efficiency indicators and other LG 
features. As we said above, relative efficiency has been calculated in different LG 
services (police, culture, sports, green areas, refuse collection and water supply).
5. Determinants of the efficiency
5.1. Economic level and tourist character
With respect to LG economic level, we do not find significant relationships (table 3). 
Nevertheless, it is worth to mention that most of the correlations (70.83%) are positive, 
which gives idea that certain relationship exists between economic level and efficiency 
in the services. On the one hand, this lack of significance agrees with the work of 
Giménez and Prior (2003). On the other hand, the positive sign of most of correlations 
seems to go against of Spann (1977), Silkman and Young (1982) and De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996), who postulated that the greater the economic level is, the higher the 
inefficiency is.
With regard to tourist level, in four out of the six services (66.67%), correlation is 
positive, although there is no statistical significance. We obtain the same result than 
Bel (2006), and thus we cannot confirm the conclusions of Bosch et al. (2000), 
Mathieson and Passell (1976) and Díez-Ticio and Mancebón (2003) (these two latter 
works, regarding police service).
(Insert Table 3)
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5.2. Size of the LG
LG size, measured by its population6, shows, in general, positive correlations with 
ratios of efficiency (see table 4). Only in police and refuse collection correlations are 
negative, although with a significance extremely reduced (0.73 and 0.97 respectively). 
The only significant correlation appears in water supply, revealing economies of scale.
(Insert Table 4)
With respect to LG extension (sqkmext), in general correlations are also positive, 
except in culture and green areas, but significance is low.
Population density (density) is positively but weakly correlated with efficiency. The 
only significance arises in green areas, since the greater dispersion of the population 
makes maintenance services more difficult. In this service, our results confirm the 
work of De Borger and Kerstens (1996). In conclusion, both predominance of positive 
correlations and low significance do not allow us to verify the conclusions obtained by 
Giménez and Prior (2003), who found that the greater the size of the LG, the greater 
the inefficiency.
5.3. Public and private management
Tables 5 to 9 depict efficiency measures of services depending on the form of 
management chosen by LG7. In general, we do not find significant differences in 
efficiency according to the way of management used by the LG.
Furthermore, analysis of these tables reveals the pattern of municipal services 
provision in the Region of Murcia. In culture, sports and green areas, direct 
management predominates, i.e., the own LG provides the service. In terms of sample 
mean, in culture and green areas, this direct management is not more efficient than the 
other forms of management, although this conclusion must be taken with caution due 
6
 Neperian logarithm of the number of inhabitants (lnpopulation).
7
 In this section, police service was excluded, since according to Spanish laws, it must be 
provided directly by the LG.
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to the lack of significance. However, sports management by the LG seems more 
efficient (in terms of sample mean).
(Insert Table 5)
(Insert Table 6)
(Insert Table 7)
With respect to refuse collection, Dijkgraaf et al. (2003) show that, according to 
literature, private provision of refuse collection service is more efficient in general. In 
our case, although with low significance, we obtain some evidence making us think 
private management is not more efficient than public. Thus, we cannot confirm the 
work of Dijkgraaf et al. (2003).
On the other hand, these authors show the percentage of city councils providing this 
service through private management in several countries: United Kingdom 30%, 
Ireland 39% and Netherlands 40%. In the case of Region of Murcia, this percentage is 
quite superior: 68.4% of LG decided to privatize the service.
(Insert Table 8)
In water supply, highly significant results demonstrate public management through a 
LG-controlled company is more efficient than private management. This result is 
contrary to Tang (1997), who showed results in this service are not conclusive.
(Insert Table 9)
On the other hand, following Dijkgraaf et al. (2003), we have divided management 
according to two classifications: in-house/out-house and public/private (see table 10).
(Insert Table 10)
Public management of refuse collection and water supply is more efficient than private 
management, though significance is not conclusive. Dijkgraaf et al. (2003), in a 
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revision of literature on refuse collection efficiency, concluded that almost all works 
find private provision more efficient. 
In refuse collection, in-house management is also more efficient than out-house 
management. The fact that both in-house and public provision of refuse collection 
service are more efficient may be revealing the collusion effect pointed out by 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2005). Only two public companies (see table 8) do not enhance 
enough competence in the market, since they are ad-hoc companies that only provide 
the service for the parent LG.
Eventually, low significance places our results in line with previous literature, where 
lack of consensus is the outstanding note.
5.4. Political sign
The political sign does not have an influence on efficiency, according to results 
depicted in table 11. In particular, aside from the shortage of significance, the 
efficiency is evenly distributed, i.e., in police, sports and refuse collection, progressive 
parties reach greater efficiency, whereas in the remaining three services, greater 
efficiency is achieved by conservative parties. This feature confirms the work of 
Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993).
(Insert Table 11)
5.5. Fiscal effort, indebtedness and financial situation
There are some works assessing the incidence of financial variables in Spanish LG; for 
example, Benito and Bastida (2004) find that non-financial surplus/deficit, financial 
independence, capital expenditures, and capital revenues are the variables that best 
explain the level of indebtedness in this type of entities; and Monasterio and Suárez-
Pandiello (2002) and Cabasés et al. (2007) study the effectiveness of institutional 
borrowing restrictions in Spanish municipalities. 
Our data show that tax burden imposed to citizens, measured by taxburdrev, is 
connected to a greater efficiency in services in general, although significance 
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(***0.002) only appears in water supply (table 12). This result confirms works of De 
Borger and Kerstens (1996), Spann (1977) and Davis and Hayes (1993).
(Insert Table 12)
Regarding the debt position of the LG, Worthington (2000) argues that greater debt 
service (lrdebtpc) results in shorter resources for services provision and thus efficiency 
decreases. Nevertheless, our results indicate that all correlations are positive except 
one, and although they are not significant, show a clear tendency. Maybe the 
explanation in this case is that greater indebtedness is the result of past capital 
investments that allow now a greater efficiency.
Short term financial situation of the LG, measured by its working capital (wcapitalpc), 
presents ambiguous relations with services efficiency. For this reason our data cannot 
confirm the work of Dijkgraaf et al. (2003), who argue that financial stress forces 
municipal managers to improve efficiency of the services as a way to obtain cost 
savings.
6. Conclusions, limitations and further research
This paper investigates the relative efficiency of a list of 6 services in the 
municipalities of the Region of Murcia (Spain), by means of DEA methodology: 
police, culture, sports, green areas, refuse collection and water supply. In a second 
phase, efficiency indicators obtained have been related to other municipal variables of 
control, evaluating in this way the determinants of the public efficiency.
With respect to the economic level of the LG, we do not find significant relationships. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to emphasize that most of correlations (70.83%) are positive, 
which gives idea of some relationship between economic level and efficiency. 
Regarding tourist level, in four out of the six services (66.67%), correlation is positive, 
although no statistical significance is found.
The size (population) of the LG reveals, in general, positive correlations with 
efficiency ratios. Only in police and refuse collection correlations are negative, 
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although with an extremely reduced significance. The only one significant correlation 
takes place with water supply, revealing the existence of economies of scale in this 
service. With respect to extension of the LG (km2), in general correlations are also 
positive, except in culture and green areas, but significance is low.
Population density is correlated positive, but weakly, with efficiency. The only 
significance appears in green areas, since the greater population dispersion hinders the 
maintenance of green areas
In water supply, highly significant results demonstrate public management through a 
company controlled by the LG is more efficient than private management. However, 
according to our results, private vs. public and in-house vs. out-house management 
comparisons, which have become very fashionable due to New Public Management 
reforms, are not clear.
Political sign does not influence fficiency. In particular, aside from the lack of 
significance, efficiency is evenly distributed, i.e., in three services progressive parties 
reach greater efficiency, and in the remaining three, the opposite pattern takes place.
This result supports the so-called “convergence” school of thought, which argues that 
industrialised societies of the twentieth century have become increasingly similar, 
facing the same kind of problems and thus using the same kind of solutions.
Consequently, political, institutional and cultural differences do not matter much when 
it comes to explain variations in policy outputs (Skinner 1976; Thomas 1980).
Fiscal effort from the tax payers is connected with a greater efficiency in the services 
in general, although significance only appears in water supply. This is good news for 
citizens, who have the right to demand value for money to the managers of their taxes. 
On the other hand, short term financial health of the LG, measured by its working 
capital, shows ambiguous relations with services efficiency.
Regarding indebtedness, the correlations are positive, except in a service (refuse 
collection), and although they are not significant, indicate a clear trend. Perhaps the 
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explanation in this case is that greater indebtedness in the last years financed 
investments that allow now a greater efficiency.
Our work has the limitation of having focused on a Spanish Region and thus the 
sample is not very large. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the response rate is very high 
69%. On the other, inputs and outputs have been thoroughly selected and provide 
extremely accurate data. Direct interviews were carried out with the participants to 
check the data in detail. This meticulousness is hard to achieve if a large and disperse 
sample of LG is considered.
Further research is needed to broaden the scope of services analysed. Besides, 
repeating the survey year after year would enhance comparisons and allow 
investigating the evolution of LG efficiency. Finally, further input and output 
indicators should be developed and tested.
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Table 1. Description of inputs and outputs used in the survey
Service Indicators
INPUTS
Costs of personnel
Current consumptions
Police
OUTPUTS
Number of interventions made
Number of detentions made
INPUTS
Costs of personnel
Current consumptions
Culture
OUTPUTS
Number of visits to municipal museums
Number of volumes in public libraries
INPUTS
Costs of personnel
Current consumptions
Sports
OUTPUTS
Number of m2 of covered sport facilities
Number of m2 supplied of discovered sport facilities
Number of users registered in municipal sport activities
INPUTS
Costs of personnel
Current consumptions
Current transfers 
Green 
areas 
OUTPUTS
Number of m2 of green areas
Number of total hours of maintenance and conservation
INPUTS
Costs of personnel 
Current consumptions
Current transfersRefuse
collection
OUTPUTS
Number of tons of domestic refusal collected
Number of tons of industrial or commercial refusal collected
  Number of industries, commercial establishments and houses in which refuse is collected daily
INPUTS
Costs of personnel
Current consumptionsWater 
supply
OUTPUTS
Number of m3 of water supplied
Number of new connections to potable water network conducted
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables
variable Description N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean St. dev.
econlevel economic level 2002 31 2.00 5.00 111.00 3.58 0.77
iecon_00 CES8 study 12, table 3.3 
economic index
31 2.00 5.00 103.00 3.32 0.75
isbie_00 CES study 12, table 3.3. 
synthetic index of well-
being
31 2.00 5.00 104.00 3.35 1.05
rfdpc_00 CES study 12, table 2.2. 
familiar available gross
income per capita 
(thousand euros)
31 6.99 9.07 245.15 7.91 0.57
tourindex tourist index: 0 no 
tourism; 592 maximum
31 0.00 592.00 1,228.00 39.61 116.56
population total population 
31.12.2002
31 5841 377,888 1,118,283 36,073.65 71,939.32
sqkmext extension of the LG, km2 31 10.00 1,675.00 9,297.00 299.90 374.48
density population density: total 
population 
31.12.2002/km2
31 9.01 2,187.31 9,382.77 302.67 444.24
polsign political sign of municipal 
government: 0_left wing; 
1_right wing
31 0.00 1.00 19.00 0.61 0.50
taxburdrev Tax burden over revenues 
(taxes/total revenues 
2002)
30 0.14 0.60 13.00 0.43 0.11
lrdebtpc long run debt per capita 
31.12.2001 (thousand 
pesetas; 1€  = 166.386 
pesetas)
31 11.20 105.85 1369.47 44.18 22.29
wcapitalpc Working capital per capita 
31.12.2001 (thousand 
pesetas)
31 -120.41 26.72 -147.34 -4.75 26.03
8
 CES: Economic and Social Council of Region of Murcia.
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Table 3. Economic and tourist level9
Economic level Tourism
econlevel iecon_00 isbie_00 rfdpc_00 tourindex
Corr. coeff. -0.04 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.04
Police
Sig. 0.80 0.35 0.75 0.76 0.76
Corr. coeff. -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.02
Culture
Sig. 0.86 0.67 0.89 0.83 0.91
Corr. coeff. 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.15
Sports
Sig. 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.38
Corr. coeff. 0.02 -0.08 0.15 0.00 0.01
Green areas
Sig. 0.91 0.62 0.38 0.98 0.96
Corr. coeff. -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.04
Refuse collection
Sig. 0.68 0.94 0.74 0.81 0.83
Corr. coeff. 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.09
Water supply
Sig. 0.18 0.58 0.15 0.54 0.56
Tau_b de Kendall. Bilateral significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
9 We must note the limitation stemming from variables iecon_00, isbie_00 and rfdpc_00, which 
refer to year 2000, being the latest available data.
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Table 4. Size of the LG
lnpopulation sqkmext density
Corr. coeff. -0.05 0.05 0.06
Police
Sig. 0.73 0.73 0.70
Corr. coeff. 0.15 -0.01 0.09
Culture
Sig. 0.33 0.94 0.59
Corr. coeff. 0.25 0.01 0.24
Sports
Sig. 0.13 0.95 0.15
Corr. coeff. 0.03 -0.20 0.27
Green areas
Sig. 0.85 0.19 * 0.08
Corr. coeff. -0.01 0.25 -0.14
Refuse collection
Sig. 0.97 0.14 0.42
Corr. coeff. ** 0.35 0.14 0.14
Water supply
Sig. 0.03 0.38 0.40
Tau_b of Kendall significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 5. Culture: management forms
Culture Efficiency
Form of management N Minimum Maximum Mean St. dev.
Direct management (own LG) 19 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.24
Autonomous public agency 2 0.63 1.00 0.82 0.26
Public company 100% controlled by LG 1 0.55 0.55 0.55 .
Significance ANOVA (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%): 0.661.
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Table 6. Sports: management forms
Sports Efficiency
Form of management N Minimum Maximum Mean St. dev.
Direct management (own LG) 16 0.22 1.00 0.87 0.26
Autonomous public agency 7 0.29 1.00 0.79 0.29
Significance Mann-Whitney (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%): 0.389.
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Table 7. Green areas: management forms
Green areas Efficiency
Form of management N Minimum Maximum Mean St. dev.
Direct management (own LG) 16 0.01 1.00 0.32 0.35
Public company 51% controlled by LG 3 0.42 0.69 0.57 0.14
Private company 4 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.05
Significance ANOVA (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%): 0.182.
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Table 8. Refuse collection: management forms
Refuse collection Efficiency
Form of management N Minimum Maximum Mean St. dev.
Direct management (own LG) 4 0.63 1.00 0.89 0.18
Public company 51% controlled by LG 2 0.57 0.99 0.78 0.30
Private company 10% controlled by LG 1 0.45 0.45 0.45 .
Private company 12 0.33 1.00 0.65 0.24
Significance ANOVA (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%): 0.271.
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Table 9. Water supply: management forms
Water supply Efficiency
Form of management N Minimum Maximum Mean St. dev.
Public company 51% controlled by LG 4 0.71 1.00 0.90 0.14
Private company 16 0.12 1.00 0.44 0.25
Significance Mann-Whitney (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%): 0.014 **
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Table 10. In-house/out-house and public/private management
Way of management (efficiency mean)
Service In house Out house Public Private
Culture 0.75 0.80 0.76 .
Sports 0.87 0.79 0.84 .
Green areas 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.11
Refuse collection *  0.89 *  0.66 *  0.85 *  0.64
Water supply . 0.52 *  0.90 *  0.44
In-house: Direct management by the own LG.
Out-house: Public entities and all types of companies.
Public: LG, Public entity, public company controlled more than 50% by LG.
Private: Private companies and those companies participated by City council below 51%.
Significance Mann-Whitney: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 11. Political sign
Progressive Conservative
N Mean St. dev. N Mean St. dev.
Police 11 0.72 0.31 16 0.61 0.33
Culture 10 0.74 0.28 13 0.77 0.20
Sports 9 0.89 0.25 14 0.82 0.28
Green areas 8 0.26 0.32 15 0.34 0.33
Refuse collection 5 0.79 0.25 14 0.68 0.24
Water supply 9 0.51 0.21 12 0.54 0.35
Significance Mann-Whitney: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 12. Budget and financial variables
taxburdrev lrdebtpc wcapitalpc
Corr. coeff. 0.00 0.01 0.06
Police
Sig. 1.00 0.93 0.67
Corr. coeff. -0.15 0.16 0.28
Culture
Sig. 0.33 0.30 * 0.07
Corr. coeff. 0.16 0.11 0.12
Sports
Sig. 0.33 0.51 0.47
Corr. coeff. 0.04 0.14 -0.14
Green areas
Sig. 0.77 0.36 0.36
Corr. coeff. 0.03 -0.08 -0.05
Refuse collection
Sig. 0.86 0.65 0.75
Corr. coeff. *** 0.50 0.20 -0.09
Water supply
Sig. 0.00 0.20 0.59
Significance Tau_b de Kendall: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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